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Abstract
In voting problems where agents have Lipschitz continuous utility functions on a multidimensional
space of alternatives, a voting rule is threshold strategy-proof if any agent can obtain only a limited
utility gain by not voting for a most preferred alternative, if the number of agents is large enough. For
anonymous voting rules it is shown that this condition is not only implied by but is in fact equivalent
to the influence of any single agent decreasing to zero as the number of agents grows. If there are
at least five agents, the mean rule (taking the average vote) is shown to be the unique anonymous
and unanimous voting rule that meets a lower bound with respect to the number of agents needed to
obtain threshold strategy-proofness.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: D72; D71
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1. Introduction
A voting mechanism for public goods is strategy-proof if no voter can gain by not
voting according to his true preference. There are good reasons to use strategy-proof voting
mechanisms: in particular, appealing properties satisfied by a mechanism (for instance
Pareto efficiency) may fail to hold for the true preferences if the agents report differently.
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In the classical model of social choice studied by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite
(1975) this price is that the mechanism is dictatorial, and in the classical literature on
demand revealing public good provision (Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973) the price is budget
imbalance. Better results are obtained if the domains of preferences and alternatives
are restricted. Moulin (1980) considers single-peaked preferences on the real line and
characterizes a class of generalized median mechanisms. In a multi-dimensional Euclidean
space with single-peaked preferences, however, a mechanism is dictatorial if it is strategy-
proof and the range of the mechanism is at least two-dimensional (Zhou, 1991). Even
in these cases, rather natural mechanisms like taking the average vote, are excluded by
strategy-proofness.
In the present paper we argue that the strategy-proofness condition may be less
compelling than it seems. First, if a mechanism is not strategy-proof, it may nevertheless be
difficult and risky for any single agent to try and manipulate the final outcome by insincere
voting if he does not know the exact preferences of the other agents. Moreover, even if
he does know these preferences he would have to take into account potential manipulation
by the other agents. Second, even if some gain may be obtained by manipulation, this
will generally be rather small if there are many agents, and it will not outweigh the cost
of finding out the best way to manipulate. For these reasons it seems safe to assume that
especially in large voting problems agents will not be interested in manipulation, even if
there is a theoretical potential for gain.
The present paper is an attempt to formalize these considerations. In our framework,
voting mechanisms that are ‘competitive’ in the sense that any single voter has negligible
influence, are shown to be hardly manipulable. This is obvious and intuitive. More
interestingly, for anonymous mechanisms (which is the usual case) also the converse holds:
limited strategic manipulability must imply competitiveness of the voting mechanism.
Taking the average vote turns out to be the unique anonymous and unanimous mechanism
that satisfies limited strategic manipulability in a sharp sense, i.e., for the minimum number
of agents.
In somewhat more detail, we assume a framework where agents have continuous
preferences on some Euclidean space, which may represent different aspects of the political
spectrum. Limited strategic manipulability is modeled by the condition of threshold
strategy-proofness on a voting mechanism or rule. This condition means that, if there
are sufficiently many agents, no agent can gain more than a small amount in utility by
not reporting a best point. This unavoidably raises the question how to measure utility
gains. This is not possible in a purely ordinal framework, and in fact we will impose
a condition of Lipschitz continuity on the utility functions representing the preferences.
Clearly, Lipschitz continuity is not preserved under arbitrary monotonic transformations
of the utility functions. It should be noted that no single-peakedness condition will be
imposed, which makes our model also in this respect different from Moulin (1980) and
Zhou (1991).
As mentioned above, the first main result of the paper is that for anonymous voting
rules threshold strategy-proofness is equivalent to a condition saying that, as the number of
agents becomes large, the influence of any single agent on the outcome of the voting rule
decreases to zero. Next, for a large class of voting rules a sharp lower bound on the number
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second main result is that, if there are at least five agents, then anonymity, unanimity, and
this sharp lower bound characterize the mean rule (taking the average of the votes). In other
words, the number of agents needed to make a voting rule ‘almost’ (threshold) strategy-
proof is minimal in case of the mean rule.
Both results confirm plausible intuitions. The first result not only establishes that
strategic manipulation issues vanish if each single voter has negligible influence, as is
the case in large voting problems. More importantly, it says that this negligible influence
is a necessary condition in order to avoid strategic manipulation. Note that this result is
not obvious: for instance, generalized medians in the one-dimensional case with single-
peaked preferences are strategy-proof but do not entail negligible influence of individuals.
The second result says that a natural rule like the mean rule seems the best one to use if
manipulation biases should only be small.
As far as we are aware the literature on this particular theme is rather limited. An early
reference is Pazner and Wesley (1978), where voters report linear orderings on a finite
set of alternatives and it is shown that, when the number of voters increases, the plurality
rule has the property that the fraction of manipulable preference profiles converges to zero.
Gary-Bobo and Jaaidane (2000) show that in a growing consumer population it is possible
to have a revelation mechanism for the production of public goods that is strategy-proof,
budget balanced, and approximately efficient. The following references concern private
goods. Roberts and Postlewaite (1976) show that in an exchange economy the gain from not
announcing one’s competitive demand goes to zero as the number of consumers increases
through replication. Gul and Postlewaite (1992) derive that in an exchange economy
with asymmetric information the tension between incentive compatibility and efficiency
disappears as the agents are sufficiently replicated. Córdoba and Hammond (1998) show
that in a class of smooth random exchange economies there are mechanisms that are
nonmanipulable in the limit with probability one. Though in a different (private goods)
context, these results are similar in spirit to ours. Schummer (1999) considers a condition
of -dominance of truth-telling in a two-person exchange economy without, however,
increasing the number of agents.
Section 2 gives the formal model and a preliminary result. Section 3 characterizes
anonymous and threshold strategy-proof voting rules, and Section 4 characterizes the mean
rule in terms of sharp threshold strategy-proofness. The more technical proofs are collected
in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
The set of alternatives is the m-dimensional Euclidean space Rm. An element of Rm
can be interpreted as the location of a public decision, or of a political party, in an election
with respect to m attributes, or political viewpoints.
Preferences are represented by utility functions u :Rm → R that are Lipschitz
continuous, that is, there is an L > 0 such that |u(a) − u(b)|  L‖a − b‖ for all
a, b ∈ Rm. Here, without loss of generality we take ‖ · ‖ to be the Euclidean norm. The
number L is called a Lipschitz constant and UL is the set of all utility functions with
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the requirement that utility functions do not exhibit fast changes.
For a compact set C ⊆ Rm, an alternative x ∈ C is a best alternative of a utility function
u in C if u(x) u(y) for all y ∈ C. Since u is Lipschitz continuous and C compact, a best
alternative always exists.
The set of (potential) agents is identified with the set of natural numbers N. Let P
denote the set of all non-empty and finite subsets of N. For N ∈ P , |N | denotes the
cardinality of the set N . A voting problem is a pair (N,p), where N ∈ P and p ∈ (Rm)N
is a profile of votes. This implies that each agent i ∈ N is allowed to report (vote for)
one alternative p(i) ∈ Rm. A voting rule F assigns to each voting problem (N,p) one
alternative F(N,p) ∈ Rm. Instead of F(N,p) we will often just write F(p), in particular
if it is obvious what the set of agents N is.
Allowing agents to report only one alternative corresponds to what is frequently
observed in existing voting procedures. It makes the mechanism simple and transparent.
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to consider also mechanisms for which agents can
report a set of points or even a complete preference. It is not obvious at all what the impact
of this on our results would be, however.
For a set of agents N ∈ P and an agent i ∈ N , the profiles p,q are called i-deviations
if p(j) = q(j) for all j ∈ N \ {i}. The central property under investigation in this paper is
the following.
Definition 1. A voting rule F is threshold strategy-proof if for every compact set C ⊆ Rm,
every L > 0, and every  > 0, there is a real number k > 0 such that for every N ∈ P with
|N |  k, every i ∈ N , all i-deviations p,q ∈ CN , and every utility function u ∈ UL for
which p(i) is a best alternative in C, we have:
u
(
F(q)
)− u(F(p)) .
Threshold strategy-proofness says the following. Suppose that votes are restricted to a
compact subset and utility functions are Lipschitz continuous. Then, if there are sufficiently
many agents, an agent cannot gain more than a small amount  by voting for a possibly
suboptimal alternative. In other words, under these conditions it is hardly worthwhile to try
and manipulate by strategic voting. The usual strategy-proofness condition would require
the inequality in the definition to hold for  = 0. Hence, threshold strategy-proofness is a
relaxation of strategy-proofness.
The following lemma shows an important consequence of threshold strategy-proofness:
by manipulation, either the resulting alternative remains approximately the same, or the
manipulating agent is almost a dictator with respect to the votes under comparison. This
result is used frequently in the sequel.
Lemma 1. Let F be a threshold strategy-proof voting rule and let C, L, , and k be
as in Definition 1. Let N ∈ P be a set of agents with |N |  k, let i ∈ N , and let
p,q ∈ CN be i-deviations. Then ‖F(p) − F(q)‖  /L or [‖p(i) − F(p)‖  /L and
‖q(i)− F(q)‖ /L].
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min{u′(x), u′(p(i))} for all x ∈ Rm. By threshold strategy-proofness and the definition
of u,
  u
(
F(q)
)− u(F(p))= Lmin{∥∥p(i) − F(p)∥∥,∥∥F(p) − F(q)∥∥}.
This implies ‖F(p)−F(q)‖ /L or ‖p(i)−F(p)‖ /L. The remaining statement in
the lemma follows by symmetry. 
3. Anonymity and threshold strategy-proofness
In this section we characterize all anonymous and threshold strategy-proof voting rules.
Let ◦ denote composition of maps.
Definition 2. A voting rule F is anonymous if for all sets of agents N,M ∈ P with
|N | = |M|, all bijections σ :M → N , and all profiles p ∈ (Rm)N , we have
F(N,p) = F(M,p ◦ σ).
In other words, a voting rule is anonymous if the identities of the agents do not matter.
Definition 3. A voting rule F is insensitive at large populations if for every  > 0 and every
compact set C ⊆ Rm there is a real number k such that for every N ∈P with |N | k, every
i ∈ N , and all i-deviations p,q ∈ CN , we have∥∥F(p) − F(q)∥∥ .
Thus, if a voting rule is insensitive at large populations, the influence of a single agent
becomes small as the number of agents becomes large. Since by Lipschitz continuity small
changes in the alternatives can lead to only small changes in utility, the condition implies
threshold strategy-proofness. Formally:
Proposition 1. Let F be a voting rule that is insensitive at large populations. Then F is
threshold strategy-proof.
Proof. Let C be a compact subset of Rm and let  > 0. Let L > 0 and choose k ∈ R such
that for every N ∈ P with |N |  k, every i ∈ N and all i-deviations p,q ∈ CN , we have
‖F(p) − F(q)‖ /L. Consequently, for such profiles and for u ∈ UL, it follows that
u
(
F(p)
)− u(F(q)) L∥∥F(p) − F(q)∥∥ .
Hence, F is threshold strategy-proof. 
The converse of Proposition 1 does not hold. For instance, a dictatorial rule, assigning
to any profile of votes the same agent’s reported point, is threshold strategy-proof but
not insensitive at large populations. Under anonymity, however, the two conditions are
equivalent.
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insensitive at large populations.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section 5. The if-part (in fact, Proposition 1)
states the intuitive and obvious fact that, if the influence of a single agent vanishes as the
population of voters becomes large, then so does his potential for strategic manipulation.
The only-if part is more interesting and more difficult to prove: if the voting rule is
anonymous and the possibility for strategic manipulation vanishes as the population grows,
then any single agent’s influence must vanish at all.1 Observe that median rules (Moulin,
1980) are anonymous but not insensitive at large populations: for those rules there always
exist situations where a single agent’s vote may have a tremendous influence on the
public outcome. Consequently, these rules also violate threshold strategy-proofness (that
is, outside of the single-peaked domain).
4. Sharp bounds and the mean rule
In this section we first derive a lower bound for the number of agents in order that
for a given voting rule each agent can gain at most  by manipulation. In other words,
we establish a lower bound for the number k as in the definition of threshold strategy-
proofness. This is done for voting rules that are anonymous and satisfy the following
property.
Definition 4. A voting rule F is translation invariant if for every set of agents N ∈ P ,
every c ∈ Rm, and every profile p ∈ (Rm)N , we have
F
(
N,p + (c, . . . , c))= F(N,p) + c.
Translation invariance makes the voting rule independent of the choice of the zero. The
next lemma provides the announced lower bound.
For a compact set C in Rm we define diam(C) := max{‖a − b‖: a, b ∈ C}.
Lemma 2. Let F be an anonymous, translation invariant and threshold strategy-proof
voting rule. Let C ⊆ Rm be convex and compact. Let  > 0, L > 0, and k  3 be as in
Definition 1. Then k Ldiam(C)/.
A proof of this lemma is given in Section 5. Corollary 1 below shows that this result
still holds if we replace translation invariance by the following condition.
Definition 5. A voting rule F is unanimous if F(a, a, . . . , a) = a for every a ∈ Rm.
Unanimity means that if all agents vote for the same alternative, then that alternative
should result.
1 At first glance this almost seems to be a corollary to Lemma 1, namely if the almost-dictatorship part of the
conclusion of that lemma could be excluded. This, however, is still some work—basically, Lemma 3 in Section 5.
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bound derived in Lemma 2. This results in a characterization of the mean rule. First, we
formalize this condition.
Definition 6. A voting rule F is sharp threshold strategy-proof if for every compact subset
C ⊆ Rm, every L > 0, every  > 0, every N ∈P with |N |L diam(C)/, all i-deviations
p,q ∈ CN , and all utility functions u ∈ UL for which p(i) is a best alternative on C, we
have
u
(
F(q)
)− u(F(p)) .
An example of a sharp threshold strategy-proof voting rule is the mean rule Fmean,
defined by Fmean(p) = ∑i∈N p(i)/|N | for every N ∈ P and every profile p ∈ (Rm)N .
Sharp threshold strategy-proofness follows from the fact that for p,q as in Definition 6,
u
(
Fmean(q)
)− u(Fmean(p)) L∥∥Fmean(p) − Fmean(q)∥∥
= L
∥∥∥∥∑
j∈N
p(j) −
∑
j∈N
q(j)
∥∥∥∥/|N |
= L∥∥p(i) − q(i)∥∥/|N |
 L diam(C)/|N |
 . (1)
Note that the mean rule is unanimous and translation invariant. It turns out that the mean
rule is the unique sharp threshold strategy-proof voting rule that is anonymous, unanimous,
and translation invariant. In fact, uniqueness still holds if we drop translation invariance.
Theorem 2. Let F be a unanimous, anonymous and sharp threshold strategy-proof voting
rule. Then F is equal to the mean rule for all profiles with at least five agents.
A proof of this theorem can be found in Section 5. The theorem still holds if we add
translation invariance. If we replace unanimity by translation invariance, then there are
additional rules satisfying the conditions (e.g., take the rule that adds an arbitrary fixed
vector x ∈Rm to the outcome assigned by the mean rule), but these cannot be unanimous.
Another observation is that in the derivation (1) of sharp threshold strategy-proofness
of the mean rule, it is easy to turn the first two inequalities into equalities by appropriate
choices of u, p, and q . As a consequence, for |N | < Ldiam(C)/, we have u(Fmean(q))−
u(Fmean(p)) > . This shows that for the mean rule the lower bound Ldiam(C)/ is sharp,
i.e., if the number of agents is smaller, then threshold strategy-proofness is violated. Now
suppose that in Lemma 2 we replace translation invariance by unanimity. If there were
an F with a lower bound below Ldiam(C)/, then F would be sharp threshold strategy-
proof and therefore, by Theorem 2, for more than five agents F would be the mean rule,
a contradiction. We have just proved the following corollary to Theorem 2.
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Let C ⊆ Rm be convex and compact. Let  > 0, L > 0, and k  3 be as in Definition 1.
Then k  Ldiam(C)/.
Theorem 2 does not hold for less than four agents. Let m = 1 and let F be the mean rule
in case the number of agents is four or more. For three agents, let F assign to every profile
p the point
2
3
min
{
p(i): i ∈ N}+ 1
3
max
{
p(i): i ∈ N};
and for two agents let F assign the lower one of the reported votes. Altogether, this defines
a voting rule satisfying the properties in Theorem 2. It is an open problem whether the rule
can also be different for the border line case of four agents. An answer to this problem,
however, is of limited interest since we are concerned with large voting problems.
The following examples establish the logical independence of the properties in
Theorem 2. In these examples, m = 1.
Example 1. For all N ∈P and p ∈RN , let
F˜ (p) := median(min{p(i): i ∈ N},0,max{p(i): i ∈ N}).
This rule is unanimous and anonymous, but not threshold strategy-proof.
Example 2. For all N ∈P and p ∈ RN , let F 0(p) := 0. This rule is anonymous and sharp
threshold strategy-proof, but not unanimous.
Example 3. For all N ∈ P and p ∈ RN , let F ′(p) := p(minN). This rule is unanimous
and sharp threshold strategy-proof, but not anonymous.
5. Proofs
We start with a technical, auxiliary lemma. For a ∈ Rm and  > 0 denote by B(a, ) :=
{x ∈ Rm: ‖a − x‖  } the ball with centre a and radius . For a set C ⊆ Rm, conv(C)
denotes the convex hull of C, i.e., the smallest convex set containing C. The lemma is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Lemma 3. The profile r is located in the disc B(c,λ/2). In ra and rb (not drawn), agent j deviates to a
and b, respectively. The lemma states that if (1) holds and if deviating to a or b makes the voting rule outcome
move close to a or b, respectively, then F cannot be anonymous.
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Let C1 = conv({a} ∪ B(c, 12λ)), C2 = conv({b} ∪ B(c, 12λ)), and C = conv(C1 ∪ C2)
(= C1 ∪ C2).
Let F be a voting rule and let N ∈ P and assume that for all i ∈ N and all i-deviations
p,q ∈ CN ,∥∥F(p) − F(q)∥∥ λ or [∥∥F(p) − p(i)∥∥ λ and ∥∥F(q) − q(i)∥∥ λ] (2)
with all inequalities strict whenever p,q ∈ (C1)N or p,q ∈ (C2)N .
Let r ∈ B(c, 12λ)N and j ∈ N , and for x ∈ Rm denote by rx the j -deviation of r defined
by r(j) = x . Assume that ‖F(ra) − a‖ λ and ‖F(rb) − b‖ λ.
Then F is not anonymous.
Proof. Without loss of generality let N = {1, . . . , n} and j = n. For t ∈ {0,1, . . . , n − 1}
and x ∈ Rm let wt,x be the profile defined for all i ∈ N by
wt,x(i) =
{
rx if i > t,
c if i  t .
For t ∈ {0,1, . . . , n − 1} we now prove that∥∥F (wt,a)− a∥∥ λ and ∥∥F (wt,b)− b∥∥ λ. (3)
Case t = 0. Since w0,a = ra and w0,b = b this is the assumption made in the statement
of the lemma.
Case t = 1. Since w1,a,w0,a are 1-deviations, (2) implies∥∥F (w1,a)− F (w0,a)∥∥< λ or ∥∥F (w0,a)− ra(1)∥∥,∥∥F (w1,a)− c∥∥< λ. (4)
Since by case t = 0 we have ‖F(w0,a) − a‖ λ and, further, ra(1) ∈ B(c, 12λ) and ‖a −
c‖ 52λ, we have ‖F(w0,a)− ra(1)‖ λ. So (4) implies ‖F(w1,a)−F(w0,a)‖ < λ. Since
‖F(w0,a) − a‖ λ, it follows that ‖F(w1,a) − a‖ < 2λ. Similarly, ‖F(w1,b) − b‖ < 2λ.
Since w1,a,w1,b are n-deviations in CN , (2) implies∥∥F (w1,a)− F (w1,b)∥∥ λ or ∥∥F (w1,a)− a∥∥,∥∥F (w1,b)− b∥∥ λ. (5)
As ‖F(w1,a) − a‖ < 2λ, ‖F(w1,b) − b‖ < 2λ, and ‖a − b‖  5λ, the first inequality in
(5) does not hold. Hence (5) implies ‖F(w1,a) − a‖  λ and ‖F(w1,b) − b‖  λ. This
concludes case t = 1.
Cases t = 2, . . . , n − 1 are analogous to case t = 1. Hence, we have proved (3).
For x, y ∈ C consider the profile vx,y ∈ CN defined for all i ∈ N by
vx,y(i) =
{
x if i = 1,
c if 1 < i < n,
y if i = n.
Since vb,a and wn−1,a are 1-deviations in CN we have by (2) that ‖F(vb,a) −
F(wn−1,a)‖  λ or [‖F(vb,a) − b‖  λ and ‖F(wn−1,a) − c‖  λ]. Now the latter
cannot be the case since ‖a − c‖ 5λ and, by (3) for t = n − 1, ‖f (wn−1,a) − a‖ λ.2
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‖f (wn−1,a) − a‖ λ this implies ‖F(vb,a) − a‖ 2λ.
Similarly one proves ‖F(va,b)−b‖ 2λ. Since ‖a−b‖ 5λ, it follows that F(va,b) 	=
F(vb,a). So F is not anonymous. 
Proof of Theorem 1. In view of Proposition 1 it is sufficient to prove the only-if part.
Suppose that F is threshold strategy-proof but not insensitive at large populations. Then it
is sufficient to prove that F is not anonymous.
Since F is not insensitive at large populations there is a δ > 0 and a compact subset C′
of Rm such that for every k′ > 0 there is a set of agents N ′ with |N ′| k′ and a j ∈ N ′ and
j -deviations v,w ∈ (C′)N ′ with∥∥F(v) − F(w)∥∥ δ. (6)
Take c ∈ C′, a, b ∈ Rm, and λ > 0 such that c = 12 (a + b), C′ ⊆ B(c, 12λ), and
‖a − b‖ 5λ. Let C,C1,C2 as in Lemma 3.
Take 0 <  < min{λ, 12δ}. By Lemma 1 there is a k > 0 such that for all N ∈ P with
|N | k, all i ∈ N and all i-deviations p,q ∈ CN , we have∥∥F(p) − p(i)∥∥,∥∥F(q)− q(i)∥∥  < λ or ∥∥F(p) − F(q)∥∥  < λ. (7)
Take k′ (as in the second paragraph of the proof) equal to k, and let N ′, j , v, and w as in
the second paragraph. Note that (2) in Lemma 3 is satisfied. So by this lemma, letting v
play the role of r , it is sufficient to prove that∥∥F (va)− a∥∥ λ and ∥∥F (vb)− b∥∥ λ,
where, analogously to rx in Lemma 3, vx is the j -deviation of v with v(j) = x . By (7) we
have: ∥∥F (va)− F(v)∥∥  or ∥∥F (va)− a∥∥ 
and ∥∥F (wa)− F(w)∥∥  or ∥∥F (wa)− a∥∥ .
Suppose that ‖F(va) − a‖ > λ. Then ‖F(va) − a‖ >  and since va = wa , we have
both ‖F(va) − F(v)‖   and ‖F(wa) − F(w)‖ = ‖F(va) − F(w)‖  . This implies
‖F(v)−F(w)‖ 2 < δ, in contradiction with (6). Thus, we must have ‖F(va)−a‖ λ.
Similarly, one proves ‖F(vb) − b‖ λ. This completes the proof of the theorem. 
We proceed with the proof of Lemma 2. For a compact set C ⊆ (Rm)N , points a and b
in C are called diametrical if diam(C) = ‖a − b‖.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let a and b be diametrical points in C. Without loss of generality
suppose k ∈ N. Let N = {1,2, . . . , k} and let the profiles p,q ∈ CN be defined by
p(i) = a + (i − 1)(b − a)/k and q(i) = a + i(b − a)/k for every i ∈ N.
Since C is convex, for all i ∈ N , p(i), q(i) ∈ C. By translation invariance, F(q) =
F(p) + (b − a)/k. Since k  3, we have ‖F(p) − a‖  ‖b − a‖/k or ‖F(q) − b‖ 
L. Ehlers et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 49 (2004) 103–116 113‖b − a‖/k. Without loss of generality assume ‖F(p) − a‖ ‖b − a‖/k. Let u′ ∈ UL be
defined by u′(x) = L‖F(p)− x‖ for all x ∈ Rm, and u by u(x) = min{u′(x), u′(a)}. (This
construction is similar as in the proof of Lemma 1.) Note that, by anonymity, p and q can
be regarded as 1-deviations. We have
  u
(
F(q)
)− u(F(p))
= u(F(p) + (b − a)/k)
= min{L‖b − a‖/k,L∥∥F(p) − a∥∥}
= L‖b − a‖/k,
where the inequality follows from threshold strategy-proofness, the first equality from
F(p) = F(q) + (b − a)/k and u(F (p)) = 0, and the third equality from ‖F(p) − a‖ 
‖b − a‖/k. Hence, k  L‖b − a‖/, which was to be proved. 
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 4. Let F be an anonymous and sharp threshold strategy-proof voting rule. Let
N ∈ P with n = |N |  5. Let C be a compact and convex subset of Rm with diametrical
points a and b. Let j ∈ N and let p,q ∈ CN be j -deviations such that p(j) = a and
q(j) = b. Then ‖F(p) − F(q)‖ ‖b − a‖/n.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that∥∥F(p) − F(q)∥∥> ‖b − a‖/n. (8)
Take L > 0 and  = L‖a−b‖/n. Let c = 12 (a+b) and for x ∈ Rm let px be the j -deviation
of p defined by px(j) = x . For x, y ∈ Rm such that a ∈ conv({x, b}) and b ∈ conv({y, a})
let Cx = conv({x} ∪ C) and Cy = conv({y} ∪ C). (Cf. Fig. 2.) Then diam(Cx) = ‖x − b‖
and diam(Cy) = ‖y − a‖.
By applying sharp threshold strategy-proofness and Lemma 1 (take for  in Lemma 1
the number L‖b − x‖/n) we have for all i-deviations v,w ∈ (Cx)N :∥∥F(v) − F(w)∥∥ ‖b − x‖/n or∥∥F(v) − v(i)∥∥,∥∥F(w) − w(i)∥∥ ‖b − x‖/n. (9)
Similarly, for all i-deviations v,w ∈ (Cy)N :∥∥F(v) − F(w)∥∥ ‖a − y‖/n or∥∥F(v) − v(i)∥∥,∥∥F(w) − w(i)∥∥ ‖a − y‖/n. (10)
Fig. 2. Proof of Lemma 4.
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for x = a, and (10) applied for y = b:∥∥F(p) − a∥∥,∥∥F(q)− b∥∥ ‖a − b‖/n. (11)
Since n 5, (11) implies∥∥F(p) − F(q)∥∥ 3‖a − b‖/n. (12)
We now first prove the following claim for x and y as above.
Claim. ‖F(px) − x‖ ‖b − x‖/n and ‖F(py) − y‖ ‖a − y‖/n.
Proof of Claim. Take a sequence z0 = a, z1, . . . , zt = x in conv({x, a}) such that
‖z −z−1‖ < 12‖z−1 −b‖ for all  = 1, . . . , t . We prove that ‖F(pz )−z‖ ‖b−z‖/n
for all  = 1, . . . , t , from which the first inequality in the Claim follows. The second
inequality can be proved analogously.
Case i = 1. First observe that by (12)∥∥F (pz0)− F (pz1)∥∥+ ∥∥F (pz1)− F (pb)∥∥
= ∥∥F(p) − F (pz1)∥∥+ ∥∥F (pz1)− F(q)∥∥ ∥∥F(p) −F(q)∥∥ 3‖a − b‖/n
> 2‖z1 − b‖. (13)
Apply (9) on Cz1 to the pair pz1 and pb = q . If ‖F(pz1) − F(q)‖ > ‖b − z1‖/n then
‖F(pz1)− z1‖ ‖b − z1‖/n and we are done. If ‖F(pz1 )−F(q)‖ ‖b − z1‖/n then by
(13) ‖F(p) − F(pz1)‖ > ‖b − z1‖/n, hence (9) applied to the pair p,pz1 on Cz1 implies
‖F(pz1) − z1‖ ‖b − z1‖/n and we are again done.
Furthermore, by (11) we have ‖F(q) − b‖ ‖a − b‖/n ‖z1 − b‖/n, so since n 5
we have∥∥F (pz1)− F(q)∥∥ 3‖b − z1‖/n.
Hence, Cases  = 2, . . . , t can be proved analogously to case  = 1.
Now take λ > 0 and aˆ, bˆ, c ∈Rm such that c = 12 (aˆ + bˆ), ‖aˆ − bˆ‖ = 5λ, C ⊆ B(c, 12λ),
C1 = conv({aˆ} ∪ B(c, 12λ)), C2 = conv({bˆ} ∪ B(c, 12λ)). (See Fig. 3.) Then, by the Claim,
‖F(paˆ) − aˆ‖  diam(C1)/n < λ and ‖F(pbˆ) − bˆ‖  diam(C2)/n < λ. Furthermore,
Lemma 1 and sharp threshold strategy-proofness imply that for all i-deviations v,w in
(Ck)N , where k ∈ {1,2,3} and C3 = C1 ∪ C2, we have∥∥F(v) − F(w)∥∥ diam(Ck)/n λ
Fig. 3. Proof of Lemma 4.
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Note that the inequalities diam(Ck)/n λ are strict for k = 1,2. Hence, Lemma 3 applies
and yields a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let N ∈ P have at least five agents and let p ∈ (Rm)N be a profile.
We proceed by induction on |p(N)|, where p(N) = {p(i): i ∈ N}.
If |p(N)| = 1, then F(p) = Fmean(p) by unanimity.
For the induction step, let |p(N)| = k > 1. Let C be the convex hull of p(N). Take
a and b in p(N) diametrical in C. Let S = {i ∈ N : p(i) /∈ {a, b}}. Let |S| = s and
n = |N | = k + l + s such that p = (ak,pS, bl). Here, ak means that k agents vote for
a, and pS = (p(i))i∈S . Let q = (ak+l, pS) and r = (pS, bk+l). The induction hypothesis
entails
F(q) = Fmean(q) = k + l
n
a + s
n
Fmean(pS) and
F(r) = Fmean(r) = k + l
n
b + s
n
Fmean(pS).
It follows that∥∥F(q) − F(r)∥∥= k + l
n
‖b − a‖.
By repeated application of Lemma 4,∥∥F(q) − F(p)∥∥ l
n
‖b − a‖ and ∥∥F(r) − F(p)∥∥ k
n
‖b − a‖.
It follows that these inequalities must be equalities, and in particular
F(p) = k
k + l F (q) +
l
k + l F (r) =
k
n
a + l
n
b + s
n
Fmean(pS) = Fmean(p).
This completes the proof of the induction step and of the theorem. 
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